




This paper develops a theory of propositional identity which distinguishes
necessarily equivalent propositions that differ in subject-matter. Rather
than forming a Boolean lattice as in extensional and intensional semantic
theories, the space of propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice. After
motivating a departure from tradition by way of a number of plausible
principles for subject-matter, I will provide a Finean state semantics for a
novel theory of propositions, presenting arguments against the convexity
and nonvacuity constraints which Fine (2016, 2017a,b) introduces. I will
then move to compare the resulting logic of propositional identity (PI1)
with Correia’s (2016) logic of generalised identity (GI), as well as the
first degree fragment of Angell’s (1989) logic of analytic containment
(AC). The paper concludes by extending PI1 to include axioms and
rules for a subject-matter operator, providing a much broader theory of
subject-matter than the collection of principles with which I will begin.
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1 Intensionalism
When do two sentences express the same proposition in virtue of their logical
form? It is important to stress that the present understanding of propositions
is intended to be worldly: propositions are, so to speak, things being a certain
way, rather than mere representations of things being some way or other.
Intensionalism is the view that what it is for propositions to be identical is
for them to be necessarily equivalent. For instance, reading xϕ ” ψy as xFor it
to be the case that ϕ just is for it to be the case that ψy, Rayo (2013, p. 66)
writes, “‘φ ” ψ’ should be thought of as equivalent to ‘lpφ Ø ψq’.” Part
of what makes intensionalism appealing is that a simple and strong range of
necessary equivalences may be derived in any normal modal logic, shedding
light on the nature of propositional identity and the abstract structure of
the space of propositions. Intensionalism is to be contrasted with the claim
that necessary equivalence may serve to approximate propositional identity
despite failing to be co-extensive with propositional identity, or else given some
∗I am greatly indebted to Mathias Böhm, Kit Fine, James Kirkpatrick, Ofra Magidor,
Michail Peramatzis, James Studd, and Tim Williamson for helpful comments and discussion.
§1 Intensionalism Benjamin Brast-McKie
specific application, that necessary equivalence may prove to be of some utility.
Certainly it should be admitted that intensional theories of propositions have
been of great utility in philosophy, logic, linguistics, and computer science.
Nevertheless, the present inquiry concerns the nature of propositional identity
itself, and not some approximation or useful application.
Instead of defining propositional identity as the intensionalist does, or in yet
some further way, primitivism claims that propositional identity is conceptually
basic, and so an informative definition in other terms cannot be provided.
Accordingly, primitivists cannot follow intensionalists in employing a modal
logic to derive a range of theorems for propositional identity from its definition.
In an attempt to characterise propositional identity, a primitivist is forced to
make a fresh start by axiomatising propositional identity rather than defining
propositional identity in terms of other primitive notions. Of course, free from
all constraints, little progress can be made, leaving one with no more than
suspicions about which identities hold in full generality. For instance, is A the
same or different proposition as either A^A or A_A? What about A and
either of the propositions A_ pA^Bq or A^ pA_Bq?
Even if propositional identity cannot be defined in other terms, a primitivist
must nevertheless look to some prior conception of the theoretical role that
propositions are meant to play in order to guide the ambition to axiomatise
propositional identity. For instance, suppose that: (1) the proposition expressed
by a sentence on a given interpretation is identified with that sentence’s truth-
condition; where (2) the truth-condition for an interpreted sentence is taken
to be the set of possible worlds in which that sentence is true.1 Leaving the
interpretation implicit, it follows that sentences which are true in the same
possible worlds express the same proposition, where of course sentences which
express the same proposition are true in the same possible worlds, and so
propositional identity ends up co-extensive with necessary equivalence. In
particular, xAy is true in the same worlds as xA_pA^Bqy, and so given (1) and
(2), the propositions expressed by xAy and xA_ pA^Bqy are identical, and so
A ” A_pA^Bq.2 Insofar as the theoretical role of propositional identity does
not require more than sameness in modal profile of the interpreted sentences
flanking the propositional identity sign, then such conclusions are easy to
accept. However, it is natural to object that although xAy and xA_ pA^Bqy
are true in the same possible worlds, these sentences need not have the same
subject-matter, where the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence is what
that interpreted sentence is about. For instance, on its intended interpretation,
the sentence ‘It is raining, or both raining and snowing’ is partly about it
snowing, where the same cannot be said of the sentence ‘It is raining’. Without
giving up on a truth-conditional account of interpreted sentences as in (1), we
may seek to refine our conception of a sentence’s truth-condition, replacing
(2) with some alternative, guided by the aim to accommodate sameness in
1 Or one could take truth-conditions to be characteristic functions from worlds to truth-values.
2 I will mostly use upper-case Roman letters to express propositions, relying on context to
resolve use-mention ambiguities, while occasionally employing corner quotes for clarity.
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subject-matter of the sentences flanking a propositional identity sign.
Setting aside whether primitivism is the right view of propositional identity
or not, I will take the propositional identity operator ‘”’ to be a primitive
term for the purposes of this paper. Instead of offering a definition, the present
ambition will be to present a logic of propositional identity which is both
motivated and constrained by the ambition to respect sameness of subject-
matter in addition to necessary equivalence. By distinguishing necessarily
equivalent propositions which differ in subject-matter, the theory of propositions
developed below will provide novel theoretical resources. Rather than exploring
any particular application of these resources, I will be concerned to trace the
contours of the resulting hyperintensional theory of propositions by providing
a definition of logical consequence as well as a derivability relation for the
first-degree fragment of a propositional language.
It is worth contrasting an opposing strategy in which an intensional theory
of propositions is merely augmented with a theory of subject-matter. For
instance, assuming propositions to be sets of possible worlds, Lewis (1988a)
identifies subject-matters with partitions of the set of all worlds, writing:
A proposition is about a subject matter, and it is a subject matter of
the proposition, iff the truth value of that proposition supervenes on that
subject matter. [. . . ] When we think of subject matters as partitions, we
can say that P is about M iff each cell of M either implies or contradicts
P . (p. 163)
The cells of a partition can be thought of as the different ways for the proposition
in question to be true or false, where M includes N just in case every cell of N
is a union of cells of M .3 For instance, consider the proposition P1 that there
are more than a hundred stars. One such subject-matter of P1 is the partition
M1 which consists of P1 and its complement within the set of all worlds W ,
whereas another partition M2 groups worlds together into cells which have the
same number of stars. Accordingly, M2 may be said to include M1. Not only
is there no unique subject-matter which a given proposition is about, Lewis
(1988a, p. 171-2) admits that non-contingent propositions are about every
subject-matter, “since there is no way at all for two worlds to give it different
truth values, a fortiori there is no way for two worlds to give it different truth
values without differing with respect to the subject matter.”4 Thus ‘The gold
atom α has 79 protons’, ‘2+2=5’, and all instances of xA_ Ay and xB ^ By
express propositions which, according to Lewis, are about all subject-matters.
Additionally, by identifying necessarily equivalent propositions, Lewis makes
all necessarily equivalent propositions about the same subject-matters. For
instance, A_ pA^Bq, A^ pA_Bq, and A will have the same subject-matters
for any A and B, and so Lewis cannot accommodate the apparent difference in
3 Lewis (1988b) speaks of inclusion, but one could read xM includes N y as xM refines N y.
4 Lewis (1988a, p. 164) does introduce the concept of least subject-matters, but admits that
there need not always be a least subject-matter for a given proposition.
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subject-matter between the proposition that it is raining and the proposition
that it is raining or both raining and snowing.
Abstracting from the details of Lewis’ account, the broader strategy aims
to capture differences in subject-matter while assuming an intensional theory
of propositions, asking for which values of X does the product PpW q ˆ X
draw enough distinctions in order to encode differences in subject-matter.5 As
fruitful as intensional theories of propositions have been for many different
applications, no such account can accommodate differences in subject-matter
between necessarily equivalent propositions. As Perry (1989) writes:
[T]he problem of necessary equivalent propositions is simply a fly bottle
that did not have to be flown into. The solution is to fly out, not to argue
that, all things considered, maybe it is not such a bad bottle to be in.
(p. 191)
Rather than attempting to present an intensional theory of propositions, or
else to augment an intensional theory of propositions with a theory of subject-
matters, I will defend a hyperintensional theory of propositions which does
not presume that the particular form of hyperintensionality in question can or
should be factored into intensional and non-intensional components.6 Before
attempting to provide such an account, it will be important to motivate criteria
for an adequate theory of propositional identity. Accordingly, §2 will present a
number of principles which I will assume that an adequate account of subject-
matter ought to include along with a minimal theory of propositional identity,
where the adoption of these principles will guide our departure from standard
Boolean theories of propositional identity. By drawing on the resources of Kit
Fine’s state semantics, §3 will present a hyperintensional theory of propositions
which accommodates differences in subject-matter, comparing the result with
Fine’s (2016, 2017a,b) theory of regular propositions in §4.
After presenting a first-degree logic for propositional identity (PI1) in §5, I
will contrast Correia’s (2016) logic of generalised identity (GI) which I show
has the unwanted consequence of making negation an opaque operator. I will
conclude in §6 by extending PI1 to include axioms and rules of inference for a
subject-matter operator, providing not only a broader theory of subject-matter,
but one in which we may derive the first degree fragment of Angell’s (1989)
logic of analytic containment (AC) in addition to comparing Fine’s (2016,
2017b,c, 2020) account of subject-matter. In §7, I will provide a few formal
results which will be of use at various points throughout the paper.
5 See Yablo (2014), Hawke (2018), Berto (2019) for other theories of this kind.
6 As Perry (1989, p. 176) also observes, “the view that language was basically intensional,
is older than possible-worlds semantics. Basically, intensions are entities that provide some
principle of classification, and that have an identity, independently of the objects so classified.”
Rather than attempting to uproot the already entrenched practice of taking ‘intensions’ to
be functions from possible-worlds to truth-values, I will maintain the spirit of Perry’s critique
of a possible worlds understanding of intensions by developing a hyperintensional alternative.
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2 Subject-Matter
In order to facilitate the presentation of a theory of subject-matter, it will help
to introduce the sentential operator ‘σ’, where σA is the subject-matter of A.
Whereas Fine (2016, 2017b,c, 2020) takes subject-matters to be states-of-affairs,
or just states, I will adopt a propositional account of subject-matter, whereby
the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence is a proposition.7 For instance,
the subject-matter of ‘It is raining’ will be a proposition to do with the rainy
weather. More specifically, §6 will argue that there is good reason to read xσAy
informally as xIt is partially the case that A or partially not the case that Ay.
By then letting A ] B :“ σA ” σB, where we may read xA ] By informally
as xA and B have the same subject-mattery, I will adopt the following:
S1  A ] A.
S3 A^A ] A.
S5  pA^Bq ] p A_ Bq.
S7 A^ pB ^ Cq ] pA^Bq ^ C.
S2 A^B ] A_B.
S4 A^B ] B ^A.
S6  pA_Bq ] p A^ Bq.
Obj pA ” Bq Ñ pA ] Bq.
Setting aside differences in formalisation, the principles above are widely
accepted.8 By S1 and S2, the converse of Obj may fail since  A ” A and
A^B ” A_B need not hold. Rather, Obj makes sameness of subject-matter
a necessary but insufficient condition for propositional identity. Nevertheless,
Obj asserts that what an interpreted sentence is about is solely a function of
the proposition expressed by that sentence on its interpretation irrespective of
the features unique to that sentence, or the concepts by which that proposition
is expressed. For instance, given that for Hesperus to be rising just is for
Phosphorus to be rising, it follows by Obj that the subject matter of Hesperus
is rising is the same as the subject-matter of Phosphorus is rising. In slogan,
the present theory takes subject-matter to be independent of guise.
I will refer to theories of subject-matter which grant Obj as objective, and
theories which reject Obj as representational. By contrast with objective
theories, representational theories make subject-matter at least partially a
function of the means by which a given proposition is expressed. For instance,
suppose that one were to take ‘Hesperus is rising’ and ‘Phosphorus is rising’
to differ in subject-matter despite expressing the same proposition. Insofar
as the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence is what that sentence is
about, what ‘Hesperus is rising’ and ‘Phosphorus is rising’ are about must
7 Although states will be taken to be objects, one may think of the states in the intended
model as propositions, for states are objects which may either obtain or fail to obtain.
8 Even in adopting an objectual account of subject matter where xσAy is taken to be a singular
term, the principles above may be maintained by instead defining A ] B :“ σA “ σB. See
Lewis (1988a), Perry (1989), Yablo (2014), Hawke (2018), Fine (2020) for accounts which are
committed to analogues of the principles above on appropriate understandings of ‘]’ and ‘σ’.
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differ. But this strikes a false note, for both sentences appear to be entirely
about the movement of the same astrological body relative to one’s position.
Since the sentences ‘Hesperus is rising’ and ‘Phosphorus is rising’ express
the same proposition, the only remaining differences between these sentences
are representational in nature, having to do with the means by which each
sentence expresses the same proposition.9 However, it would be inappropriate
to identify the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence with the means by
which that sentence expresses the proposition that it does, at least insofar as
the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence is what that sentence is about.
For instance, neither ‘Hesperus is rising’ nor ‘Phosphorus is rising’ are about
anything the least bit representational, and so the ways in which these sentences
differ cannot be identified with their different subject-matters. Nevertheless,
a representational theory of subject-matter could take the subject-matter of
an interpreted sentence to be a function of the means by which that sentence
expresses a proposition. Instead of pursuing this line, I will develop an objective
theory of subject-matter where the subject-matter of an interpreted sentence is
a function of the proposition which that sentence expresses. Thus I will speak
directly of the subject-matter of each proposition, whether or not there is a
sentence which expresses that proposition on a given interpretation.
Even in granting Obj, this principle cannot provide positive determinations
of which propositional identities hold on account of including the propositional
identity sign in its antecedent. Nevertheless, it follows from Obj that any
discrepancies in the subject-matters of A and B entail that A and B are
distinct. In this way, a theory of subject-matter may inform our present aim
to provide a theory of propositional identity. Additionally, we may draw the
following connection between the subject-matter of A and the propositions
which are wholly relevant to A, where xA ĺ By reads xIt being the case that A
is wholly relevant to it being the case that By, or for ease, xA is relevant to By:
Rel pA ] Bq Ñ rpC ĺ Aq Ñ pC ĺ Bqs.
If A and B share the same subject-matter— if what A and B are about is the
same— then whatever is relevant to A must also be relevant to B. Together,
Obj and Rel provide a means by which to distinguish propositions, for given
some C where C ĺ A but C ł B, it follows that A]/ B by Rel, and so A ı B
follows by Obj. Of course, such evaluations will depend on judgements about
relevance. Nevertheless, Obj and Rel provide an additional basis by which to
evaluate propositional identity claims for truth.
Recall the claim from before that although A and A_ pA^Bq have the
same modal profile, they may fail to share the same subject-matter. Even more
starkly, A_ A and B_ B may diverge completely in subject-matter despite
both being necessary. For instance, the sentences ‘I am sitting or not sitting’
and ‘Grass is green or not green’ both express necessary propositions despite
9 In particular, one might consider the syntactic differences between sentences, or else the
different concepts thereby expressed.
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having entirely distinct subject-matters, where neither is even partially about
the other. In order to account for the possible divergence in subject-matter
between A_ A and B _ B, we may observe that even without giving a full
theory of relevance, it is natural to accept the following principle:
L1 A ĺ A_B
L3 B ĺ A_B
L2 A ĺ A^B
L4 B ĺ A^B
Given some A and B for which A ł B_ B, we know by L1 that A ĺ A_ A,
and so pA_ Aq ı pB_ Bq follows by Obj and Rel, where a similar argument
concludes that pA^ Aq ı pB ^ Bq on the basis of L2 in place of L1 in the
previous argument.10 For instance, my sitting fails to be wholly relevant to
grass being green or not green, though of course my sitting is relevant to me
sitting or not sitting. Thus by Obj and Rel, it is not the case that for me to
be sitting or not sitting just is for grass to be green or not green.
Similar arguments may be given against adopting the absorption laws.
Given some A and B where B ł A but B ĺ rA_ pA^Bqs, it follows by Obj
and Rel that A ı A_pA^Bq.11 For instance, although it snowing is relevant
to it raining or both raining and snowing, it snowing fails to be relevant to it
raining, and so by Obj and Rel, it is not the case that for it to be raining just
is for it to be raining or both raining and snowing. A similar argument shows
that not all instances of A ” A^ pA_ Bq hold. Given these considerations,
we find reason to take exception to the following Boolean identities:
#Necs pA_ Aq ” pB _ Bq.
#Imps pA^ Aq ” pB ^ Bq.
#Abs1 A ” A_ pA^Bq.
#Abs2 A ” A^ pA_Bq.
Whereas intensional theories of propositions are Boolean insofar as they affirm
all of the Boolean identities, I will develop a non-Boolean alternative. In
accordance with a conservative methodology, I will maintain as many of the
Boolean identities as possible without overlooking differences in subject-matter.
More specifically, I will assume that just as differences in either the subject-
matter or the modal profile of A and B provide a reason to distinguish A and
B, sameness in both the subject-matter and the modal profile of A and B
provides at least a defeasible reason to maintain their identity.
In order to begin to evaluate the broader space of propositional identities,
I will assume that anything deserving of the title ‘propositional identity’ ought
to satisfy all instances of the following principles:
10 Given the definition of relevance presented in §6, we may show that A ĺ B _ B just in
case A ĺ B, where of course there are some A and B where A ł B, and so A ł B _ B.
11 One may show that B ĺ rA_ pA^Bqs as well as its dual is a theorem of PI1σ given in §6.
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Ref A ” A.
Sym pA ” Bq Ñ pB ” Aq.
Trans pA ” Bq Ñ rpB ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqs.
Imp pA ” Bq Ñ pAÑ Bq.
Rejecting any of the principles above would be to change the topic from
propositional identity to something else entirely. Additionally, given the present
concern with worldly propositions, I will restrict attention to propositional
operators which are insensitive to the means by which propositions are expressed.
More precisely, we may say that an operator Q is transparent in a language L
just in case all instances of the following principle hold, where x ~OpB{Aqy is the
result of freely substituting xBy for xAy in the sequence of Q’s operands x ~Oy:
Func pA ” Bq Ñ rQp ~Oq ” Qp ~OpB{Aqqs.
Intuitively, a sentential operator is transparent in a language just in case it
expresses a propositional function, where the output is determined solely by
the inputs independent of the means of expressing those inputs. A language L
is transparent just in case every operator Q in L is transparent in L.
Given the present concern with the structure of the space of propositions
independent of the structure of the different means of representing those
propositions, I will restrict consideration to transparent languages throughout.
As P2 in §7 shows, any propositional language L which includes the extensional
connectives ‘ ’, ‘^’, and ‘_’ along with the propositional identity operator ‘”’
is transparent just in case the following principle holds without exception in L,
where xCpB{Aqy is the result of freely substituting xBy for xAy in xCy:
LL pA ” Bq Ñ pC Ñ CpB{Aqq.
The principle above expresses Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals
whereby identicals satisfy the same conditions. Instead of adopting LL as an
independent assumption, P1 and P2 in §7 show that so long as Ref and Imps
hold without exception, Sym, Trans, and LL follow from the stipulation
that the language under consideration is transparent. Since the restriction to
transparent languages was motivated by the concern to study the structure of
the space of worldly propositions independent of any representational difference
in thought or language, LL may be taken to inherit the same motivation given
the ambition to provide a theory of identity for worldly propositions.
It is important to stress that in articulating a theory of propositional
identity, we need only take a stand on the transparency of a limited range of
operators. In particular, I will take the operators for conjunction, disjunction,
negation, and subject-matter to be transparent. Letting an operator be opaque
in L just in case it is not transparent in L, the present paper need not take
a stand on whether there are genuine cases of opacity, though I take it that
there are such genuine cases, where it is in virtue of this fact that synonymy is
much more fine-grained than propositional identity.12
12 See Dorr (2016), Bacon (2019), Bacon (2019), and Caie et al. (2019) for recent discussion
of opacity, as well as §6 for further comparison between synonymy and propositional identity.
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Given that all instances of LL hold without exception in a language with
operators for conjunction, disjunction, negation, and subject-matter, we may
derive S3 – S7 from the following identities by means of classical reasoning:
A1 A^A ” A.
A3 A^B ” B ^A.
A5 pA^Bq ^C ” A^ pB ^Cq.
A7  pA^Bq ” p A_ Bq.
A9 A ”   A.
A2 A_A ” A.
A4 A_B ” B _A.
A6 pA_Bq _C ” A_ pB _Cq.
A8  pA_Bq ” p A^ Bq.
Moreover, given S1 – S7, we may show that each of the identities above
respects sameness of subject-matter. Given that these identities also respect
necessary equivalence, a conservative methodology recommends adopting these
principles in the absence of countervailing considerations. Suppose that one
were to attempt to support the following principles by an analogous argument:
#Dist1 A_ pB ^ Cq ” pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq.
#Dist2 A^ pB _ Cq ” pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq.
We may observe that the principles for subject-matter given so far do not
provide any means by which to evaluate whether the identities above respect
sameness of subject-matter. Since intuitive judgements about which principles
for subject-matter hold without exception can only carry us so far, the following
section will present a semantic theory for a propositional language, providing
a systematic means of surveying the total space of possible counterexamples to
propositional identity claims. As I will show in §4, there are strong abductive
reasons to exclude #Dist1 and #Dist2 from the logic of propositional identity
on account of admitting a compelling class of counterexamples.
3 State Semantics
In giving up the Boolean identities #Necs, #Imps, #Abs1, and #Abs2, it
remains to provide an alternative non-Boolean theory of propositions. Instead
of attempting to axiomatise propositional identity by means of intuition alone,
this section will draw on Kit Fine’s state semantics in order to provide a
theory of propositions which is sensitive to hyperintensional differences in
subject-matter while satisfying the principles adopted above.
For simplicity, I will focus on the first-degree fragment of the propositional
language L “ xL, ,_,^,”y with sentence letters L “ tpi : i P Nu, postponing
consideration of extensions which include a subject-matter operator to §6.
Given L, we may define the extensional sentences of L as follows, where p P L:
A ::“ p |  A | A^A | A_A.
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Letting extpLq be the set of extensional sentences in L, I will take A ” B to
be an identity sentence in L for any A,B P extpLq, where idpLq is the set of
identity sentences in L. Following Fine (2017a,b,c), we may take a state space
to be an ordered pair S “ xS,Ďy, where S is a non-empty set, Ď is a partial
order on S, and S forms a complete lattice which is defined in the usual way:
Upper Bound: s P S is an upper bound of X Ď S iff x Ď s for every x P X.
Least Upper Bound: s is a least upper bound of X Ď S iff s is an upper
bound of X, and s Ď y for every upper bound y of X.
Complete Lattice: S is a complete lattice iff every X Ď S has a least upper
bound.
As the uniqueness of a least upper bound for any set X is readily established,
we may refer to the least upper bound
Ů
X of X as the fusion of the states
in X, designating the full state by
Ů
S “ ‚ and the null state by
Ů
∅ “ ˝. It
remains to employ these resources to interpret the identity sentences in idpLq
in a manner which accords with the principles defended above.
Given a state space S “ xS,Ďy, I will follow Fine (2017a, p. 629) in taking
propositions to be ordered pairs of sets of states which satisfy some number of
constraints depending on the application. Whereas the following section will
raise general problems for the theory of regular propositions which Fine (2016,
2017a) develops, the present section will present a competing alternative which
I will argue is well suited to the application at hand. In particular, consider
the space of normal propositions which may be defined over any state space S:
Normal Contents: CS “ tX Ď S :
Ů
Y P X for all nonempty Y Ď Xu.
Normal Propositions: PS “ txX,Y y : X,Y P CSu.13
Given any state space S “ xS,Ďy, an S-model of L is any ordered triple
M “ xS,Ď, | ¨ |y where |p| “ x|p|`, |p|´y with |p|˘ Ď S for every p P L.14 An
S-model M is normal just in case |p| P PS for every p P L. We may then take
N to be the class of all normal S-models of L for any state space S, employing
set notation where it is convenient.15 In order to identify which sentences are
true in all normal models of L, we must first provide appropriate semantic
clauses for the primitive operators included in the language.
Following Fine (2016, 2017c), we may recursively define exact verification
, and exact falsification - by means of the inclusive semantics given below,
letting t.d :“
Ů
tt, du for ease of exposition:
13 I will discuss Correia’s (2016) related view in §5 which Fine (2017a, p. 629) also cites.
14 One could add top and bottom elements to the language where S-models are required to
assign |J| “ xS,∅y and |K| “ x∅, t˝uy which are the top and bottom elements with respect
to ď, letting J́ :“  J and
J́
:“  K be the top and bottom elements with respect to Ď. By
contrast, Fine (2017a, p. 630) takes xS, t‚uy to be a top element on account of excluding
consideration of all vacuous propositions. See §4 below for further discussion.
15 Though nothing turns on this point, I will officially assume a no-class theory of classes.
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pp q` M, s , p iff s P |p|`.
pp q´ M, s - p iff s P |p|´.
p q` M, s ,  A iff M, s - A.
p q´ M, s -  A iff M, s , A.
p^q` M, s , A^B iff s “ t.d where M, t , A and M, d , B.
p^q´ M, s - A^B iff M, s - A or M, s - B or M, s - A_B.16
p_q` M, s , A_B iff M, s , A or M, s , B or M, s , A^B.
p_q´ M, s - A_B iff s “ t.d where M, t - A and M, d - B.
As a useful heuristic, we may consider an intended state space SI , where SI
is the set of all states-of-affairs, and ĎI is a parthood relation. Instead of
considering which sentences are true or false in which possible worlds, where
worlds contain a great number of things which are completely irrelevant to
any given sentence, exact verification and falsification is a matter of which
sentences are “made” true or false by which states, where the truth-makers
and falsity-makers must be wholly relevant to the sentences that they make
true or false, respectively.17 Although the exact verifiers for a conjunction are
determined by the exact verifiers for its conjuncts, where similarly the exact
verifiers for a disjunction are determined by the exact verifiers for its disjuncts,
the same cannot be said for negation.18 In particular, one cannot take any
state which does not exactly verify a sentence to exactly verify its negation,
at least insofar as states are required to be wholly relevant to the sentences
which they exactly verify or falsify. It is for this reason that the state semantics
assumes a bilateral form, extending consideration to exact falsifiers in addition
to exact verifiers so as to identify the exact verifiers (falsifiers) for a sentence
with the exact falsifiers (verifiers) for the negation of that sentence. In this
respect, the inclusive semantics makes an important addition to (1) given in §1
by including falsity-conditions alongside truth-conditions.
Constructing the state semantics around the idea that states are to be
wholly relevant to the sentences which they exactly verify or falsify also makes
the notions of exact verification and falsification non-monotonic. Focusing on
exact verification, Fine (2017a) brings this point out as follows:
For it is to be a general requirement on verification that a verifier should
be relevant as a whole to the statement that it verifies; and in extending
a verifier with additional material, this holistic relevance of the verifier to
the statement may be lost. (p. 626)
For instance, if the state t of Julieta thinking exactly verifies the sentence
‘Julieta is thinking’, and the state d of Julieta writing exactly verifies the
sentence ‘Julieta is writing’, then the fusion t.d fails to be wholly relevant to
‘Julieta is thinking’ as well as to ‘Julieta is writing’ on account of including
16 Removing the final disjunct from p^q´ and p_q` yields the non-inclusive semantics.
17 See Fine (2017a,b,c) for related discussion, as well as §4 below.
18 Instead of considering what is relevant to the truth (falsity) of a sentence, one may consider
what is relevant to either the truth or falsity of a sentence. See §6 for related discussion.
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something irrelevant in each case. Nevertheless, the fusion state t.d exactly
verifies the conjunction ‘Julieta is thinking and writing’ on account of being a
fusion of exact verifiers for each of its conjuncts, where similarly, any fusion
of exact falsifiers for ‘Julieta is thinking’ and ‘Julieta is writing’ will exactly
falsify the disjunction ‘Julieta is thinking or writing’.
It remains to consider the exact verification clause for disjunction, and the
exact falsification clause for conjunction. We may begin by observing that a
disjunction is exactly verified by the exact verifiers for either of its disjuncts,
and similarly, a conjunction is exactly falsified by the exact falsifiers for either
of its conjuncts. Additionally, the inclusive semantics respects the claims that:
ptq any exact verifier for a conjunction A^B will also be an exact verifier for
the disjunction A_ B; and, pfq any exact falsifier for A_ B will also be an
exact falsifier for A^B. In order to justify these latter additions, consider:
Uniformity: A class K of models of L is uniform iff for any S-modelM P K
and A P extpLq, there is an S-modelM‹ P K and p P L where
|p|`‹ “ ts PM :M, s , Au and |p|´‹ “ ts PM :M, s - Au.
It is natural to require the class of models over which L is to be interpreted to
be uniform since nothing about the sentence letters in L should prevent them
from expressing the same propositions expressed by the complex sentences in
extpLq. Without requiring uniformity to hold, the law of uniform substitution
is liable to fail, where uniform substitution is a natural desideratum for any
logic. However, were one to give up (t), then the exact verifiers for a disjunction
might fail to be closed under fusion, where the same may be said of the exact
falsifiers for a conjunction were one to give up (f).19 Given that the exact
verifiers and falsifiers for any sentence letter are required to be closed under
fusion, rejecting either (t) or (f) leads in each case to the non-uniformity of
N , thereby providing a reason to maintain the inclusive semantics.
Insofar as we are to restrict consideration to the class of normal models
N of L, uniformity provides a powerful reason to maintain both (t) and (f)
in the inclusive semantics. In order to motivate the initial restriction to N ,
it will help to set |A|` “ ts P S :M, s , Au and |A|´ “ ts P S :M, s - Au,
adopting |A| “ x|A|`, |A|´y as standard notation for the proposition that A
expresses in M. We may then provide the following semantic clause for the
first-degree identity sentences in idpLq, along with the definitions of logical
consequence and validity for an arbitrary class of models K:
p”q M ( A ” B iff |A| “ |B|.
Logical Consequence: ϕ P idpLq is a K-logical consequence of Γ Ď idpLq,
i.e. Γ (K ϕ, just in case for any M P K, if M ( γ
for all γ P Γ, then M ( ϕ.
Validity: ϕ is K-valid just in case (K ϕ.
19 Fine (2016, p. 206) establishes this result in Lemma 6.
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Suppose that instead of adopting the inclusive semantics, one were to give up
(t) and (f), maintaining uniformity by also giving up the closure condition on
the sets of states which make up propositions. As Fine (2017c, p. 563) observes,
A and A ^ A may then diverge in their exact verifiers, where A and A _ A
may diverge in their exact falsifiers, thereby producing counterexamples to A1
and A2. However, since A agrees in both subject-matter and modal profile
with A^A and A_A, we find no reason to distinguish between A and either
A^A or A_A given our present aims. Thus if the semantics is to validate
A1 and A2, then A ^ A and A _ A must have the same exact verifiers and
falsifiers as A. It follows that the sets of exact verifiers and falsifiers for A must
both be closed under finite fusion in S, where a set of states X is closed under
finite fusion in S just in case t.d P X whenever both t, d P X.
Let a finite fusion modelM of L be any S-model of L where both |p|˘ are
closed under finite fusion in S. Insofar as there may be more than one exact
verifier or falsifier for a sentence in a finite fusion model of L, it follows that
the exact verifiers and falsifiers for a sentence may contain more than what is
strictly required to make that sentence true or false respectively, and so need
not be minimal.20 For instance, any fusion of two or more exact verifiers for A
is also an exact verifier for A, and so will contain proper parts which exactly
verifies A, where something similar may be said for a fusion of two or more
exact falsifiers for A. Moreover, it is not clear what would motivate a restriction
on overdetermination of this kind to merely finite fusions. For instance, given
any real number 625 ď x ď 740, we may take sx to be the state of α reflecting
light with wavelength x nanometers, where R “ tsx : 625 ď x ď 740u. Insofar
as each sx P R is an exact verifier for the sentence ‘α reflects red light’, we may
admit that
Ů
Y exactly verifies ‘α reflects red light’ for any nonempty Y Ď R.21
In order for infinite fusions of exact verifiers (falsifiers) to be admitted as exact
verifiers (falsifiers) for sentences, I have taken normal propositions to include
sets of states closed under infinite rather than finite fusion, restricting attention
to the class of models N in which normal propositions are assigned to sentence
letters. We may then show by an simple induction proof that closure under
infinite fusion extends to all extensional sentences in extpLq.
Although I will not provide much in the way of an exploration of the
modalised state spaces introduced by Fine (2017c), it is nevertheless worth
considering a primitive distinction between possible and impossible states,
where every part of a possible state is also required to be possible. We may
then say that two states t and d are compatible just in case their fusion t.d
20 Compare minimal situations as used by Kratzer (1989) and Heim (1990) among others, as
well as exemplifiers which Kratzer (1998, 2002) later employs.
21 Considerations of gunk also motivate taking fusions of sets of exact verifiers of any non-zero
cardinality to be exact verifiers. If a gunky ice cube is entirely pink, then the state of any
part of it being pink will exactly verify the sentence ‘Part of the ice cube is pink’, where if
a is a part of b, then the state of a being pink is also part of the state of b being pink. It
follows that for any non-null part of the ice cube a, the state of a being pink will consist of
an infinite fusion of exact verifiers for the sentence ‘Part of the ice cube is pink’. See von
Fintel (2002) for discussion of a related issue for Kratzer’s situation semantics.
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is possible, and incompatible otherwise. For instance, although the state of
my sitting and the state of my standing are both possible, their fusion is
impossible, making these states incompatible. Insofar as sentences are to admit
of incompatible exact verifiers (falsifier), we may observe that far from an
obscure artefact of the framework, impossible states do important work in
drawing hyperintensional distinctions. In particular, it is natural to assume
that no exact verifier v and falsifier f for a single sentence A could ever be
compatible. However, it follows that every exact verifier for A^ A is a fusion
of an exact verifier and falsifier for A, and so must therefore be impossible.
Nevertheless, we may observe that whenever the exact verifiers and falsifiers
for A and B do not share any parts in common, A ^  A and B ^  B are
exactly verified and falsified by different impossible states, as are A_ A and
B _ B. Thus A^ A and B ^ B may be distinct despite sharing the same
modal profile, where the same may be said for A_ A and B _ B, and so
as desired, neither #Imps nor #Necs are valid over N .
In addition to including counterexamples to #Imps and #Necs, neither
#Abs1 nor #Abs2 are N -valid. In particular, we may consider the model
MA “ xSA,Ď, | ¨ |Ay where SA “ Ppta, b, c, duq with |p1|A “ xttauu, ttbuuy and
|p2|A “ xttcuu, ttduuy, for pairwise distinct a, b, c, and d. We may then derive:
|p1 _ pp1 ^ p2q|A “ xttau, ta, cuu, ttbu, tb, duuy
|p1 ^ pp2 _ p2q|A “ xttau, ta, cuu, ttbu, tb, duuy.
Since ttauu ‰ ttau, ta, cuu and ttbuu ‰ ttbu, tb, duu, it follows from p”q that
bothMA * p1 ” p1_pp1^p2q andMA * p1 ” p1^pp1_p2q. SinceMA P N ,
neither #Abs1 nor #Abs2 are N -valid as claimed above. In order to add
texture to the present counterexample, we may take p1 to be ‘It is raining’ and
p2 to be ‘It is windy’, where tau is a rainy weather state and tcu is a windy
weather state. It follows by the inclusive semantics that although ta, cu exactly
verifies ‘It is raining and windy’, and so ta, cu also exactly verifies ‘It is raining
or both raining and windy’, the same cannot be said for ‘It is raining’, thereby
indicating a discrepancy between the set of exact verifiers for ‘It is raining’
and ‘It is raining or both raining and windy’. Similar considerations show that
the sentences ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is raining and either raining or windy’ have
different exact verifiers, and so do not express the same proposition.
By invalidating #Necs, #Imps, #Abs1, and #Abs2, the inclusive
state semantics satisfies the initial aim set out in §2 to provide a theory of
propositional identity which respects differences in subject-matter. Given that
the definition of N -logical consequence is perfectly general, it is straightforward
to compute the N -validity of any of the propositional identity sentences in L.
We may then ask whether N -validity yields an extensionally adequate theory of
propositional identity given the aim to track subject-matter, while preserving
as many of the Boolean identities as possible. Instead of attempting to provide
a determinate answer for all identity sentences in idpLq, the following section
will begin by presenting considerations in favour of excluding #Dist1 and
#Dist2 from the logic of propositional identity.
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4 Distribution Laws
In addition to the counterexamples to #Necs, #Imps, #Abs1, and #Abs2,
the semantics also admits counterexamples to #Dist1 and #Dist2. Letting
MD “ xSD,Ď, |¨|Dy with SD “ Ppta, b, c, d, e, fuq where |p1|D “ xttauu, ttbuuy,
|p2|D “ xttcuu, ttduuy, and |p3|D “ xtteuu, ttfuuy, for pairwise distinct a, b, c,
d, e, and f , we may derive the following identities:
|p1 _ pp2 ^ p3q|D “ xttau, tc, eu, ta, c, euu, ttb, du, tb, fu, tb, d, fuuy
|pp1 _ p2q ^ pp1 _ p3q|D “ xttau, ta, cu, ta, eu, tc, eu, ta, c, euu, ttb, du, tb, fu, tb, d, fuuy
|p1 ^ pp2 _ p3q|D “ xtta, cu, ta, eu, ta, c, euu, ttbu, td, fu, tb, d, fuuy
|pp1 ^ p2q _ pp1 ^ p3q|D “ xtta, cu, ta, eu, ta, c, euu, ttbu, tb, du, tb, fu, td, fu, tb, d, fuuy.
Given that the underlined sets of exact verifiers (falsifiers) are not identical,
we may conclude by p”q that MD * A_ pB ^ Cq ” pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq and
MD * A^pB_Cq ” pA^Bq_pA^Cq, and so neither #Dist1 nor #Dist2
are N -valid.22 However, the intuitive basis for claiming that #Dist1 and
#Dist2 do not respect sameness of subject-matter is not nearly as obvious
as it is for the absorption laws. Since #Dist1 and #Dist2 respect sameness
in modal profile, I will take there to be a presumption in favour of accepting
#Dist1 and #Dist2 on grounds of parsimony, drawing fewer distinctions in
the absence of countervailing considerations. Nevertheless, there are powerful
abductive reasons for taking counterexamples such as MD seriously, excluding
#Dist1 and #Dist2 from the logic of propositional identity rather than
restricting the space of models so as to rule out such counterexamples.
We may begin by observing that, modulo simplifying assumptions, the
counterexample above commands a degree of intuitive appeal. For instance,
let tau be the state of the ball being black, tcu be the state of the ball being
round, and teu be the state of the ball being iron, where p1 is ‘The ball is
coloured’, p2 is ‘The ball is shaped’, and p3 is ‘The ball is metallic’. It follows
that the fusion state ta, cu of the ball being black and round fails to exactly
verify ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’. This conclusion
follows from the observations that: (1) ta, cu includes tcu as a part, and so
does not exactly verify ‘The ball is coloured’ since tcu is irrelevant; (2) ta, cu is
not a fusion of exact verifiers for ‘The ball is shaped’ and ‘The ball is metallic’,
and so does not exactly verify ‘The ball is shaped and metallic’; and (3) ta, cu
is not a fusion of exact verifiers for ‘The ball is coloured’ and ‘The ball is
shaped and metallic’, and so does not exactly verify ‘The ball is coloured and
both shaped and metallic’. Without changing the inclusive semantics, ta, cu
does not exactly verify ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see that ta, cu exactly verifies ‘The ball is coloured or
22 Correia (2016, p. 111-2) presents an analogous counterexample to #Dist1 articulated in
terms of his supersentence semantics, but does not extend similar considerations to #Dist2
as above, claiming instead that #Dist2 is valid. See §5 for further discussion.
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shaped’ on account of exactly verifying ‘The ball is coloured and shaped’, and
so ta, cu exactly verifies ‘The ball is both coloured or shaped, and coloured or
metallic’. Given these considerations, we may conclude that MD corresponds
to an intuitively compelling counterexample to Dist1, where something similar
may be shown for Dist2, making it unnatural to exclude these cases.
Insofar as the present notion of validity may claim to be reasonably natural,
arbitrary models of L should not be excluded from consideration by fiat alone.
Rather than attempting to hand pick the models of L which are to be considered
in evaluating the validity of identity sentences, one may attempt to provide
motivation for adopting a principled restriction on the class of models. In
particular, Fine (2016, 2017a) considers the following restriction:
Regular Contents: CrS “ tX P CS : y P X whenever x Ď y Ď z for some x, z P Xu.
Regular Propositions: PrS “ txX,Y y : X,Y P CrSu.
Regularity: An S-modelM is regular iff M P N and |p| P PrS for all p P L.
In order to motivate restricting consideration to regular models, Fine (2017a)
appeals to the simplicity of the space of regular propositions, writing:
Regular propositions have an especially simple form. For each such
proposition P (if non-empty) will have a maximal verifier p, the fusion of all
its verifiers, which we identify with its subject-matter— the agglomeration
of the facts, so to speak, from which its verifiers are drawn; and it will also
have various low lying verifiers, with all other verifiers lying above them.
The proposition itself will then consist of all the states that lie between
the low lying verifiers and the maximal verifier. Regular propositions are
therefore subject to a limited form of monotonicity; given that a state
verifies a regular proposition then so does any extension of the state as
long as it lies within the subject-matter of the proposition. (p. 628-9)
It is worth considering the manner in which the limited form of monotonicity to
which Fine refers fails to hold in the counterexamples to Dist1 and Dist2. In
particular, with respect to Dist1, the outlier states in |pp1 _ p2q ^ pp1 _ p3q|
`
D
all lie between states in |p1 _ pp2 ^ p3q|
`
D, despite failing to be members of
|p1_pp2^p3q|
`
D, and so |p1_pp2^p3q|
`
D fails to be regular. Something similar
may be said for Dist2 since |p1 ^ pp2 _ p3q|
´
D also fails to be regular.
Despite the fact that neither |p1 _ pp2 ^ p3q|
`
D nor |p1 ^ pp2 _ p3q|
´
D are
regular, we may nevertheless observe that MD is a regular model, at least
insofar as all other sentences letters are assigned to regular propositions. Even
so, the complex sentences p1_pp2^p3q and p1^pp2_p3q do not express regular
propositions, and so the class of regular models R fails to be uniform over
the inclusive semantics. Rather than giving up regularity, one may maintain
uniformity by adopting the following alternative semantic clauses:
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p^q´s M, s - A^B iff t Ď s Ď d for some t and d where M, d - A_B
and either M, t - A or M, t - B.
p_q`s M, s , A_B iff t Ď s Ď d for some t and d where M, d , A^B
and either M, t , A or M, t , B.
I will refer to the result of replacing p^q´ and p_q` in the inclusive semantics
with the clauses above as the super inclusive semantics. We may then show that
R is uniform over the super inclusive semantics so that for any S-modelM P R
and A P extpLq, the proposition |A| P PrS . Additionally, we may show that
#Dist1 and #Dist2 are R-valid over the super inclusive semantics. However,
these validities have come at the cost of a significant increase in the complexity
of the semantics for conjunction and disjunction. Even supposing that the
space of regular propositions could be shown to be simpler than the space of
normal propositions, we must nevertheless weigh this increase in simplicity
against the increase in complexity of the super inclusive semantics.
Given the super inclusive semantics together with a modelM P R, we may
refer to the elements of |A|` as the liberal verifiers for A in M, and refer to
the elements of |A|´ as the liberal falsifiers for A in M.23 In addition to the
increase in complexity, it is natural to object that the super inclusive semantics
does not capture the most compelling falsity-conditions for conjunction, nor
truth-conditions for disjunction. For instance, in the example above, both tau
and tc, eu liberally verify ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’,
but the same cannot be said for tcu considered on its own. However, given that
tcu is part of tc, eu, it follows that ta, cu liberally verifies ‘The ball is coloured
or both shaped and metallic’. By contrast, ta, cu does not exactly verify ‘The
ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’ on account of including tcu as a
part which makes no contribution to the truth of the sentence when considered
on its own, or even when fused with tau. Whereas ta, c, eu overdetermines the
truth of ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’ on account of being
the fusion of more than one state which makes the sentence true, the same
cannot be said for ta, cu since it is only when fused with teu that tcu may be
said to contribute to making ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’
true. Accordingly, without being fused to teu, the state tcu is irrelevant to the
truth of ‘The ball is coloured or both shaped and metallic’, and so tcu without
teu disqualifies ta, cu as an exact verifier for that sentence.
Even if one were to relax the notion of relevance holding between states
and the sentences which they make true or false, the super inclusive semantics
faces a further difficulty. In particular, one must restrict attention to the class
R` of nonvacuous regular models of L which may be defined as:
Nonvacuous: An S-modelM is nonvacuous iff both |p|˘ ‰ ∅ for all p P L.
23 Although liberal verifiers (falsifiers) may be defined as the convex closure of the exact
verifiers (falsifiers) for a sentence, exact verification (falsification) cannot be defined in terms
of liberal verification (falsification) since different sets may have the same convex closure.
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Without restricting consideration to just the nonvacuous regular models, we
may let ME “ xSE ,Ď, | ¨ |Ey with SE “ Ppta, b, cuq and |p1|E “ x∅, ttauuy,
|p2|E “ xttauu,∅y, and |p3|E “ xttbuu, ttcuuy for distinct a, b, and c, where:
|p1 ^ p3|E “ x∅, ttau, tcu, ta, cuuy;
|p1 _ p3|E “ x∅, tta, cuuy;
|p2 _ p3|E “ xttau, tbu, ta, buu,∅y;
|p2 ^ p3|E “ xtta, buu,∅y.
Since p1 has no liberal verifiers, there are no liberal verifiers for p1^ p3, and so
no state lies between a liberal verifier for p1^ p3 and a liberal verifier for either
p1 or p3. Even though tbu liberally verifies p3, it follows by the super inclusive
semantics for disjunction that there are no liberal verifiers for p1 _ p3, where a
similar line of reasoning explains why there are no liberal falsifiers for p2 ^ p3
despite the fact that tcu liberally falsifies p3. However, this is far from natural.
By contrast, the inclusive semantics for disjunction maintains that any exact
verifier for a disjunct ought to immediately qualify as an exact verifier for the
disjunction to which it belongs, where similarly, the inclusive semantics for
conjunction takes every exact falsifier for a conjunct to immediately qualify as
an exact falsifier for the conjunction to which it belongs. Letting a proposition
be vacuous just in case it either has no exact verifiers or no exact falsifiers, we
may refer to the unnatural effects induced by the super inclusive semantics as
vacuous annihilation. Although a proponent of the super inclusive semantics
could prevent vacuous annihilation from occurring by restricting consideration
to the class of nonvacuous regular models R`, there is nothing to motivate
this restriction aside from the ambition to avoid vacuous annihilation.24
In addition to being ad hoc, the restriction to nonvacuous models trades on
the implicit assumption that the sentence letters in L are naturally interpreted
over the space of nonvacuous propositions. However, we may show in opposition
to this assumption that the restriction to nonvacuous propositions prevents
the space of propositions from assuming an otherwise much more natural form.
To begin with, one may expect that any theory of propositions ought to be
bounded insofar as for any set of propositions U , there is a proposition B which
entails every proposition in U , as well as a proposition T which is entailed
by every proposition in U . By letting U be the set of all propositions, we are
guaranteed the existence of an upper bound which is entailed by all propositions,
as well as a lower bound which entails all propositions. For instance, in an
extensional theory of propositions, the upper and lower bounds on the space of
propositions are the only propositions— namely, truth and falsity— where we
may model these by t1u and ∅, with subset inclusion for entailment. Similarly,
intensional theories of propositions may be modelled by PpW q for nonempty
W , where subset inclusion is entailment, and the set all worlds W and the set
of no worlds ∅ are the upper and lower bounds. Not only are such extensional
24 For instance, Fine (2017a, p. 649) considers restricting attention to nonvacuous propositions,
providing a number of results which turn on this assumption.
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and intensional theories of propositions bounded, this fact follows from their
completeness, whereby any set U of propositions has a least upper bound
as well as a greatest lower bound with respect to entailment, where these
correspond to semantic analogues of infinite disjunction and conjunction for
the propositions in U , respectively. Although completeness and boundedness
could be given up, there is nothing to recommend these further departures from
tradition given the present ambition to provide a theory of propositions which
respects differences in subject-matter. Thus in accordance with a conservative
methodology, I will take there to be a presumption in favour of maintaining
the boundedness and completeness of the present theory of propositions.
By contrast with extensional and intensional theories of propositions which
are ordered by a single entailment relation, the present aim to accommodate
differences in subject-matter yields a theory of propositions which admits of two
distinct orders. To see where these orders come from, consider the abbreviated
proofs from Boolean logics that conjunctive-parthood A Ď B :“ A ^ B ” B
and disjunctive-parthood A ď B :“ A_B ” B are converse relations:
A Ď B ñ A^B ” B (def)
ñ A_ pA^Bq ” A_B (LL)
ñ A ” A_B (#Abs1)
ñ B _A ” A (A4, LL)
ñ B ď A. (def)
A ď B ñ A_B ” B (def)
ñ A^ pA_Bq ” A^B (LL)
ñ A ” A^B (#Abs2)
ñ B ^A ” A (A3, LL)
ñ B Ď A. (def)
Giving up #Abs1 and #Abs2 blocks the derivations provided above. Rather,
A Ď B may hold without B ď A holding, and vice versa. For instance, although
A Ď A^B is valid, A^B ď A may fail to hold, since pA^Bq_A need not be
wholly relevant to A, and so pA^Bq _A ı A. Similarly, although A ď A_B
is valid, A_ B Ď A need not hold, since pA_ Bq ^ A may fail to be wholly
relevant to A, and so pA_Bq ^ A ı A. Whereas conjunctive-parthood and
disjunctive-parthood are two ways of specifying the same order in a Boolean
theory, these relations may come apart in the present setting.25 Nevertheless,
the points given above with regards to boundedness and completeness may be
reiterated for both orders: with respect to Ď and ď, the space of propositions
ought to be bounded both above and below, where this feature follows from
the stronger requirement that both orders form complete lattices.
25 As I argue elsewhere, ‘ď’ and ‘Ď’ provide natural regimentations of constitutive readings
of ‘necessary for’ and ‘sufficient for’. See also Fine (2015) and Correia and Skiles (2019).
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Insofar as disjunctive-parthood and conjunctive-parthood are taken to be
complete (and so bounded) lattices, we may show that the spaces of both
normal propositions PS as well as regular propositions PrS form bilattices,
providing natural hyperintensional analogues of the Boolean lattices familiar
from extensional and intensional logics. In order to bring this out, we may
define semantic correlates of conjunctive-parthood, disjunctive-parthood, and
negation as follows, where X “ xX`, X´y and Y “ xY `, Y ´y are propositions:
Essence: X Ď Y iff : (1) for every b P Y ` there is some a P X` where a Ď b;
(2) a.b P Y ` whenever a P X` and b P Y `; and
(3) X´ Ď Y ´.
Ground: X ď Y iff : (1) for every b P Y ´ there is some a P X´ where a Ď b;
(2) a.b P Y ´ whenever a P X´ and b P Y `; and
(3) X` Ď Y `.
Inversion:  xX`, X´y “ xX´, X`y.
Given the definitions above, we may show for any normal model M P N that:
(1) M ( A Ď B just in case |A| Ď |B|; (2) M ( A ď B just in case |A| ď |B|;
and (3) | A| “  |A|. Since R Ď N , these results also apply to the class of
regular models. We may then consider the following definition:
Bilattice: A structure B “ xP,Ď,ď, y is bilattice iff xP,ďy and xP,Ďy are
complete lattices where P contains at least two elements and  is
a unary operator which satisfies the conditions: (1)   X “ X;
(2) X ď Y “  X Ď  Y ; and (3) X Ď Y “  X ď  Y .
The definition above was originally presented by Ginsberg (1988, 1990), and
studied extensively by Fitting (1989a,b, 1990, 1991, 1994, 2002), among others.
Whereas both BS “ xPS ,Ď,ď, y and BrS “ xPrS ,Ď,ď, y may be shown to be
bilattices, we may nevertheless observe that the same cannot be said of the
corresponding spaces of nonvacuous propositions, thereby falling short of what
otherwise belongs to a natural class of structures.26
Even if one were to give up boundedness, and hence completeness— taking
the space of propositions to form an unbounded bilattice in the sense studied
by Bou and Rivieccio (2011)— it is natural to maintain that each order forms
a lattice over the space of propositions so that for any two propositions there is
guaranteed to be both a least upper bound as well as a greatest lower bound.27
However, spaces of nonvacuous propositions do not form bilattices (unbounded
26 This is not to claim that philosophers ought to be bound to what mathematicians have
found to be most natural. Rather, I take it that without powerful motivation to do otherwise,
a conservative methodology recommends beginning by thoroughly investigating appropriate
applications of the most natural mathematical resources that have already been developed.
27 An unbounded bilattice consists of two lattices with at least two elements together with a
unary operator satisfying the conditions (1) – (3) in Bilattice above.
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or otherwise) since for any two propositions X and Y where no state is a part
of either the exact verifiers or falsifiers for both X and Y , there may fail to be a
lower bound for X and Y with respect to either order, and so no greatest lower
bound for X and Y . Without admitting vacuous propositions, the space may
at most be said to consist of two join-semilattices with at least two elements
and a unary operator which satisfies the conditions (1) – (3) in the definition
of a bilattice, though there is little to suggest that such structures make up a
reasonably natural class.28 Fine (2017a) makes a related observation, writing:
The domain of propositions has the structure of a lattice from a classical
point of view and the structure (or something like the structure) of a
bilattice from the present point of view. (p. 643, ft. 10)
Instead of following Fine (p. 649) in focusing on nonvacuous propositions,
establishing a range of results which turn on nonvacuity, I will restrict attention
in what follows to the normal and regular bilattices BS and BrS .
Given the arguments above, a proponent of a regular theory of propositions
cannot adopt either an inclusive or super inclusive semantics, at least insofar
as the uniformity of R is to be maintained while avoiding nonvacuous collapse.
In order to identify a suitable semantics for a regular theory of propositions, it
will help to define the propositional operators which are expressed by ‘^’ and
‘_’ when interpreted over the inclusive semantics, where X,Y P PS :
Content Fusion: J [K “ tx.y : x P J, y P Ku.
Conjunction: X ^ Y “ xX` [ Y `, X´ Y Y ´ Y pX´ [ Y ´qy.
Disjunction: X _ Y “ xX` Y Y ` Y pX` [ Y `q, X´ [ Y ´y.
Given the inclusive semantics, we may show that for any normal modelM P N ,
both: (I) |A ^ B| “ |A| ^ |B|; and (II) |A _ B| “ |A| _ |B|. Moreover, we
may show that X ^ Y and X _ Y are the least upper bounds of X,Y P PS
with respect to Ď and ď, specifying clear theoretical roles for conjunction and
disjunction to play within any bilattice of propositions BS .29
Although PS is closed under the operators ^ and _, the same cannot be
said of PrS , where it is this fact together with (I) and (II) which explains why R
fails to be uniform over the inclusive semantics. In order to maintain a regular
theory of propositions, Fine (2017a, p. 632) considers the convex closure of
the exact verifiers and falsifiers specified by the inclusive semantics, where the
resulting semantic operations may be shown to be equivalent to the following:
28 Fine (2017a, p. 642) takes conjunction to be the greatest lower bound with respect to
containment, flipping the perspective on conjunctive-parthood which I will maintain. See §6
for Fine’s definition of containment along with a comparison to Essence.
29 These results may be taken to show that the semantic relations given in Essence and Ground
are indeed the semantic correlates of conjunctive-part and disjunctive-part, respectively. One
may also consider operators b and ‘ for the greatest lower bounds with respect to Ď and ď,
referring to these as common essence and common ground, respectively.
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Span: rJ,Ks “ ty : x Ď y Ď z for some x P J and z P Ku.
Convex Conjunction: X ©̂ Y “ xX` [ Y `, rX´ Y Y ´, t
Ů
pX´ Y Y ´qusy.
Convex Disjunction: X _© Y “ xrX` Y Y `, t
Ů
pX` Y Y `qus, X´ [ Y ´y.
We may then show that PrS is closed under ©̂ and _©, where indeed X ©̂ Y
and X _© Y are the least upper bounds with respect to Ď and ď respectively,
so long as X and Y are restricted to PrS . In place of the inclusive semantics, I
will refer to the result of disjoining the super inclusive semantic clauses and
the inclusive semantic clauses as the extremely inclusive semantics. Given
any regular model M P R, we may then show that |A^B| “ |A| ©̂ |B| and
|A _ B| “ |A| _© |B| hold with respect to the extremely inclusive semantics,
making R uniform over the extremely inclusive semantics. Moreover, neither ^
nor _ result in vacuous annihilation as observed above for the super inclusive
semantics, making the extremely inclusive semantics a superior alternative, at
least insofar as a regular theory of propositions is to be maintained.
Recall Fine’s claim from before that regular propositions have an especially
simple form. As we have seen, the space of nonvacuous regular propositions
does not satisfy the definition of a bilattice, and diverges from extensional and
intensional theories of propositions in being unbounded and incomplete, where
it is not clear what would motivate such departures given our present aims.
At the same time, admitting vacuous propositions makes R fail to be uniform
over the inclusive semantics, motivating the super inclusive semantics which is
at least uniform over R. However, the super inclusive semantics gives rise to
vacuous annihilation, providing a reason to adopt the much more complicated
and less natural extremely inclusive semantics which avoids both of these
defects. Nevertheless, the bilattice of regular propositions BrS satisfies both:
Interlaced: A bilattice B “ xP,Ď,ď, y is interlaced iff pX ‹Zq ˝ pY ‹Zq if
X ˝ Y where ‹ P t^Ď,^ď,_Ď,_ďu and ˝ P tď,Ďu, where ^˝
and _˝ are the least upper bounds with respect to Ď and ď.
Distributive: A bilattice B “ xP,Ď,ď, y is distributive iff whenever
‹, ˚ P t^Ď,^ď,_Ď,_ďu, then X ‹ pY ˚ Zq “ pX ‹ Y q ˚ pX ‹ Zq.
By contrast with BrS , the bilattice of normal propositions BS may fail to be
distributive, and so non-interlaced since— as Fitting (1990) observes— every
distributive bilattice is interlaced. Although being distributive and interlaced
are elegant properties for a bilattice to have, such virtues must be weighed
against the increase in complexity of the extremely inclusive semantic clauses.
Even more importantly, we must ask which properties are appropriate given
the application at hand. In addition to their added complexity, I take the
counterexamples discussed at the beginning of the present section to show that
the extremely inclusive semantics fails to provide natural semantic clauses for
conjunction and disjunction for the same reasons given for the super inclusive
semantics. In particular, one must weaken the manner in which states are
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required to be relevant to the sentences that they verifier or falsifier, adopting
appropriate liberalisations of verification and falsification in place of the exact
analogues. It is on these grounds that I will continue to maintain the inclusive
semantics, extending consideration to all models in N as required by uniformity,
and so will exclude #Dist1 and #Dist2 from the logic of propositional identity.
Nevertheless, Interlaced and Distributive articulate at least one sense in which
regular propositions may be said to enjoy a degree of simplicity which normal
propositions do not, thereby corroborating Fine’s claims above.
Even in giving up #Dist1 and #Dist2 in addition to #Abs1 and #Abs2,
on account of admitting counterexamples when evaluated over N given the
inclusive semantics, the following principles may be shown to be N -valid:
A10 A^ pA_Bq ” A_ pA^Bq.
A11 A_ pB ^ Cq ď pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq.
A12 A_ pB ^ Cq Ď pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq.
A13 A^ pB _ Cq ď pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq.
A14 A^ pB _ Cq Ď pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq.
Whereas A10 asserts that order does not matter in both conjoining and
disjoining a proposition B with a proposition A, A11 – A14 provide analogues
of #Dist1 and #Dist2 for disjunctive-parthood and conjunctive-parthood.
Rather than offering an intuitive basis for accepting the principles above, I will
take A10 – A14 to be justified by their N -validity given the reasons presented
above for adopting the inclusive semantics along with the full range of normal
models included in N . It remains, however, to provide a broader description of
the N -logical consequence relation, surveying the space of N -valid principles.
In the following section, I will make a start by providing a logic for propositional
identity which is sound over N given the inclusive semantics.
5 A Logic of Propositional Identity
Whereas §2 considered a range of principles in which identity operators occurred
within the scope of extensional operators, the syntax presented in §3 restricted
consideration to the propositional identity sentences in idpLq. Imposing this
restriction simplified the semantics, while still providing a systematic means of
evaluating identity sentences for validity. Given these syntactic restrictions,
I will refer to the axiom system which results from combining the axioms
A1 – A12 with the following rules of inference as The First-Degree Logic for
Propositional Identity (PI1), where A13 and A14 may then be derived:
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R1 A ” B $ B ” A.
R3 A ” B $  A ”  B.
R5 A ” B, B ” C $ A ” C.
R2 A ” B $ pA^Cq ” pB^Cq.
R4 A ” B $ pA_Cq ” pB_Cq.
I will take $1pi to be the smallest relation to satisfy the axioms and rules of
inference for PI1 which is closed under the standard structural rules, where
ϕ P idpLq is a theorem of PI1 just in case $1pi ϕ as usual. It is straightforward
to show that PI1 is sound with respect to the inclusive semantics and class
N of normal models of L. Accordingly, the motivation presented above for
adopting the inclusive semantics and class of models N extends to each of the
theorems of PI1. Additionally, R1 – R5 may be derived from Ref, Imps, and
Func in a background classical propositional logic, providing further reason to
accept these rules of inference as uncontroversial.
In addition to deriving A13 and A14 in PI1, we may show more generally
that PI1 has the following duality property, where δpϕq is the result of swapping
all conjunction and disjunction signs in ϕ, and δpΓq “ tδpγq : γ P Γu:
Duality: A logic Λ is dual iff δpΓq $Λ δpϕq whenever Γ $Λ ϕ.
In contrast to PI1, Correia and Skiles (2019) present a logic of generalised
identity (GI), which is the result of both excluding R3 from PI1 while also
including #Dist2. Although Correia and Skiles explicitly exclude #Dist1
from GI— thereby giving up duality— they do not offer any motivation for
leaving #Dist1 out when #Dist2 has been included in GI. Instead, Correia
and Skiles defer to the supersentence semantics provided in Correia (2016) over
which #Dist2 may be shown to be valid, despite admitting counterexamples
to #Dist1. Although Correia says nothing to motivate the use of his semantics
either by reference to a stock of principles which his semantics validates or else
by means of an intended model, he nevertheless shows that his semantics is
equivalent to a Finean inclusive state semantics for the extensional operators
together with the following alternative clause for propositional identity:
p”qc M (c A ” B iff |A|` “ |B|`.
Whereas p”q required A and B to have the same exact verifiers and falsifiers in
M, Correia only requires A and B to have the same exact verifiers inM, taking
ϕ P idpLq to be valid just in case M (c ϕ for all M P N`— i.e., (N
`
c ϕ—
where N` is the class of nonvacuous normal models of L.30 Correia (2016,
p. 109) does not, however, provide any explicit motivation for adopting p”qc
over the semantics given in p”q, nor for restricting consideration to nonvacuous
30 Fine and Jago (2019, p. 539) present a system of exact entailment where exact entailment
is defined solely in terms of exact verification with corresponding implications for distribution,
where A_ pB ^Cq exactly entails pA_Bq ^ pA_Cq but not vice versa, while A^ pB _Cq
and pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq exactly entail each other, disrupting an otherwise natural duality.
24
§5 A Logic of Propositional Identity Benjamin Brast-McKie
models, despite how much turns on these choices. Having already considered
the demerits of restricting consideration to nonvacuous models, I will focus on
the results of adopting Correia’s semantics for propositional identity.
If PS is to model the space of propositions expressed by the sentences of a
language, it is natural to assume that A ” B is true in an S-model just in case
A and B are assigned to the same object inside PS by that model. Indeed, this
is precisely what p”q asserts. By contrast, p”q` only requires two sentences
to have the same exact verifiers for identity to hold, and so A ” B may be
true in a model for Correia despite the fact that |A| ‰ |B|. This leads to a
number of undesirable effects, perhaps most vividly exhibited by the invalidity
of R3. In particular, counterexamples to R3 may be naturally extended to
counterexamples to Func from which it follows that the negation operator
is opaque, and so it follows by P2 that LL does not hold.31 Despite these
surprising results, Correia and Skiles say nothing to acknowledge or defend the
conclusion that negation is an opaque operator. By contrast, I will take the
extensional operators ‘ ’, ‘^’, and ‘_’ to be paradigm cases of transparent
operators, maintaining a classical reading of ‘Ñ’ in Func and LL.32
The fact that Correia and Skiles cannot claim that Func and LL hold
without exception in a language with operators for propositional identity and
the extensional operators is a direct result of the asymmetry between truth and
falsity which Correia (2016) includes in his semantics. By contrast, it is easy
to see why R3 comes out valid when one takes both the truth-conditions and
falsity-conditions for sentences into consideration in evaluating propositional
identity claims as in p”q from §3. Assuming A ” B is true in an arbitrary model
M, it follows from p”q that A and B have the same exact verifiers and falsifiers.
Given that negation inverts the exact verifiers and falsifiers,  A and  B will
also have the same exact verifiers and falsifiers, and so  A ”  B will come out
true in M. Of course, this argument breaks down if the truth of A ” B only
requires the sameness of the truth-conditions. As brought out by MD above,
two sentences may share the same truth-condition without sharing the same
falsity-condition, and so the fact that A and B share the same truth-condition
says nothing of whether  A and  B share the same truth-condition. Despite
limiting consideration to truth-conditions in evaluating propositional identity
claims, Correia maintains consideration of both truth-conditions and falsity-
conditions in evaluating the extensional sentences in extpLq, making it all the
more mysterious what motivates the sudden asymmetry late in his semantics.33
31 Similar problems arise for Correia’s (2004) semantics of analytic containment.
32 Other transparent operators include the metaphysical modals ‘l’ and ‘♦’, constitutive
operators for essence and ground ‘Ď’ and ‘ď’, as well as the propositional identity operator
‘”’ itself. I take it that metaphysics ought to concern itself with working out which of the
principles that can be articulated with such operators as these hold in full generality.
33 Although one could define A ” B :“ pA ”g Bq ^ p A ”g  Bq in a less syntactically
restricted language, or uniquely characterise ” with the rules A ”g B, A ”g  B $ A ” B,
A ” B $ A ”g B, and A ” B $  A ”g  B, one must ask why ”g has be axiomatised
rather than propositional identity ”. Correia and Skiles (2019) do not, however, consider
either this definition or this characterisation of ” in terms of the rules previously indicated.
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Rather than maintaining an asymmetry between the truth-conditions and
falsity-conditions in the semantics for propositional identity, I will take the
validity of R3 to be an immediate consequence of p”q together with p q` and
p q´, from which it follows that negation is a transparent operator.
6 Subject-Matter Revisited
Recall from §2 the manner in which differences in subject-matter were taken
to indicate differences between propositions. In particular, #Necs, #Imps,
#Abs1, and #Abs2 were all found to admit of exceptions, both motivating
and constraining the development of the state semantics for L presented in §3.
I then argued in §4 that there are strong abductive reasons for taking exception
to #Dist1 and #Dist2, where §5 presented a logic of propositional identity
which is sound over the semantics. It remains, however, to extend the language
L to include the subject-matter operator ‘σ’, providing both a semantics and
logic for ‘σ’, thereby supplying a more substantial theory of subject-matter
than the collection of principles initially presented in §2.
We may begin by considering the extension Lσ “ xL, , σ,_,^,”y of L,
defining the pre-identity sentences of Lσ as follows, where p P L is arbitrary:
A ::“ p |  A | σA | A^A | A_A.
Letting pidpLq be the set of pre-identity sentences of Lσ, I will take A ” B to
be an identity sentence in Lσ for any A,B P pidpLq, where idσpLq is the set of
all identity sentences in Lσ, and eqpLq Ď idσpLq is the set of all equivalences
in Lσ of the form A ] B. In addition to maintaining the inclusive semantics
defended in §3 together with the clause p”q for propositional identity, we may
now consider the following clauses for the subject-matter operator:
pσq`c M, s , σA iff x Ď s Ď y for some x, y P S where M, x , A and M, y , A.
pσq´c M, s - σA iff x Ď s Ď y for some x, y P S where M, x - A and M, y - A.
A set of states X is convex just in case y P X whenever x Ď y Ď z for some
x, z P X. Letting rXs “ ty : x, z P X and x Ď y Ď zu be the convex closure of
X, it is easy to show that rrXss “ rXs.34 We may then refer to the semantic
clauses given above as the convex semantics for σ since the exact verifiers
(falsifiers) for σA is the convex closure of the exact verifiers (falsifiers) for A.
Letting PI1c be the result of including the following axioms and rule of inference
in PI1, we may show that given the convex semantics, PI1c is sound over the
class of nonvacuous normal models N` of Lσ:
I am grateful to Kit Fine and Tim Williamson for helpful discussion of these points.
34 Alternatively, one could define rXs “ rX,Xs, where rXs is defined in Span from §3 above.
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R6 A ” B $ A ] B
S8 σσA ” σA.
S9 A_ pB ^ Cq ] pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq
S10 A^ pB _ Cq ] pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq
It is worth noting that R6 makes ‘σ’ a transparent operator such that σ
operates solely on the propositions expressed by the sentences to which ‘σ’ is
appended, thereby capturing Obj given in §2. Additionally, S3 – S7 stated in
§2 follow immediately from R6 given the identities included in PI1.
Were one to extend consideration to all normal models in N , both S9
and S10 will admit of counterexamples. Letting MF “ xSF ,Ď, | ¨ |F y with
SF “ Ppta, b, c, d, e, fuq where |p1|F “ xttauu, ttbuuy, |p2|F “ xttcuu, ttduuy,
|p3|F “ x∅, tteuuy, and |p4|F “ xttfuu,∅y, for pairwise distinct a, b, c, d, e,
and f , we may derive the following identities:
|p1 _ pp2 ^ p3q|F “ xttauu, ttb, du, tb, eu, tb, d, euuy
|pp1 _ p2q ^ pp1 _ p3q|F “ xttau, tcu, ta, cuu, ttb, du, tb, eu, tb, d, euuy
|p1 ^ pp2 _ p4q|F “ xtta, cu, ta, fu, ta, c, fuu, ttbuuy
|pp1 ^ p2q _ pp1 ^ p4q|F “ xtta, cu, ta, fu, ta, c, fuu, ttbu, tdu, tb, duuy.
Since the convex closures of the underlined sets are not identical, neither S9
nor S10 is N -valid on the convex semantics. Although one could rule out all
such counterexamples by restricting consideration to the nonvacuous models
in N`, imposing such restrictions faces the same criticism brought out in §4.
Moreover, without justifying the restriction to N`, the convex semantics fails
to provide a basis of support upon which to claim that the distribution laws
respect sameness of subject-matter as asserted by S9 and S10.
Despite the shortcomings faced by the convex semantics, we may observe
that ‘]’ has the same derived semantic clause as the semantics which Fine
(2016) provides for synonymy in the first degree fragment of Angell’s (1989)
logic of analytic containment (AC), or what Fine calls analytic equivalence,
where rAs˘ “ ty : x Ď y Ď z and x, z P |A|˘u is the convex closure of |A|˘:
p]q M ( A ] B iff rAs˘ “ rBs˘.
Whereas synonymy asserts the identity of the meanings of two terms— in this
case sentences— the same cannot be said for identity of subject-matter. In
particular, both S1 and S2 reproduced below ought to come out valid:
S1  A ] A S2 A^B ] A_B
Although  A and A may be said to have the same subject-matter, they do
not have the same meaning, where something similar may be said of A^ B
and A _ B. However, neither S1 nor S2 is valid over the convex semantics.
Not only do these considerations provide reason to reject the convex semantics
for subject-matter, they also raise doubts for Angell’s (1989) logic AC. Given
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that synonymy in AC is coextensive with sameness of subject-matter in PI1c,
and that distinct propositions may nevertheless have the same subject-matter,
it follows that synonymy in AC is not as fine-grained as propositional identity.
In particular, we may observe that although S9 and S10 have been included
in PI1c, neither #Dist1 nor #Dist2 belong to PI
1
c. However, this is far from
natural. Rather, one may expect synonymy to be at least as fine-grained as
propositional identity, if not much more fine-grained on account of the same
propositions being expressed by sentences with different meanings.35
Despite the disparity between the theoretical targets for analytic equivalence
and propositional identity, it is worth reviewing Fine’s reasons for taking the
identity of the convex closures of the exact verifiers (falsifiers) for A and B to
provide a semantics for analytic equivalence rather than the identity of sets of
exact verifiers (falsifiers) for A and B. To begin with, Fine defines the following
notion of containment where T and U are arbitrary sets of states:
Containment: T ă U iff : (1) for all u P U , there is some t P T where t Ď u; and
(2) for all t P T , there is some u P U where t Ď u.
Instead of providing an independent theoretical target for containment, Fine
(2016) takes containment to provide a semantics for a unilateral notion of
analytic entailment which only concerns exact verifiers, writing:
Containment is the relation between contents which is the analogue of the
relation of analytic entailment between statements. Thus we will want to
say that A analytically entails C just in case the content of A contains
the content of C. (p. 207) [. . . ] If the relation T ă U is genuinely to
represent a relation of partial content, of T being part of the content U ,
then we would expect the relation to be antisymmetric. (p. 208)
Even in supposing there to be a clear theoretical target by which to evaluate
accounts of analytic entailment, Fine says nothing in support of the claim that
containment amounts to the most natural notion of partial content, or that it
provides the most natural semantics for analytic entailment. Nevertheless, it is
clear that Fine takes antisymmetry to be essential to any genuine parthood
relation, and so given this assumption, antisymmetry is required of containment
insofar as containment is to be a notion of partial content. Although Fine
(2016, p. 208) shows that containment is only antisymmetric for convex sets of
states, he provides no other grounds for restricting attention to convex sets of
states rather than revising his definition of containment.
Fine (2016, p. 201) defines analytic entailment as A _ B :“ A ] A^B,
where ‘]’ expresses analytic equivalence. Although Fine takes ‘]’ to be a
primitive term instead of being defined in terms of ‘σ’ as above, the semantics
that Fine (p. 217) provides for ‘]’ is equivalent to p]q derived above. We may
35 Fine (2016) proves that AC is sound and complete over his semantics, and so ϕ P eqpLq is
a theorem of PI1c just in case ϕ is valid over N` given the convex semantics.
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then follow Fine in deriving the following semantic clause from the definitions
of analytic equivalence and containment for all M P N`:
p_q M ( A _ B iff rBs` ă rAs` and rBs´ Ď rAs´.36
Given any A which has exact verifiers, and any B which does not have exact
verifiers, A^ B _ A will not hold, contrary to Fine’s (p. 201) expectations.
However, following Fine (p. 205) in restricting attention to nonvacuous models
faces the same objections brought out in §4 above. By contrast, one may take
conjunctive-parthood to provide a notion of partial content where xA Ď By reads
xA is analytically entailed by By, observing that A Ď A^B and B Ď A^B are
valid even without restricting consideration to nonvacuous models. Although
it remains to specify a theoretical target for partial content against which
conjunctive-parthood may be evaluated for adequacy, we may derive the
following results, where I have included disjunctive-parthood for comparison:
pĎq M ( A Ď B iff |A| Ď |B|.
pďq M ( A ď B iff |A| ď |B|.37
In addition to these results above, conjunctive-parthood may be shown to be
antisymmetric so long as A1, A3, and R5 all hold.38 Accordingly, taking
conjunctive-parthood to play the role of partial content avoids the need to close
the exact verifiers and falsifiers for the propositions in question under convexity.
Without an argument that p_q is preferable to pĎq in attempting to provide an
adequate semantics for analytic entailment, the assumption that partial content
ought to be antisymmetric does not provide a reason to require propositions
to be convex, for as we have seen, conjunctive-parthood is antisymmetric even
without closing the exact verifiers and falsifiers under convexity.
Setting aside the connections between sameness of subject-matter in PI´c
and analytic equivalence in AC, there is good reason to consider the undirected
semantics for ‘σ’ on account of validating S1 over all normal models in N :
pσq`u M, s , σA iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t , A_ A.
pσq´u M, s - σA iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t - A^ A.
On the undirected semantics, σA is both exactly verified and falsified by the
parts of the exact verifiers and falsifiers for A. It also follows that both of the
following principles are valid, where S12 follows from S1 and S11 by R5:
36 Whereas Fine (2016, p. 217) considers the wider space of nonvacuous models where sentence
letters may be assigned to propositions whose contents are nonempty but not necessarily
closed under fusion, it will suffice for present purposes to restrict consideration to N`.
37 It is worth observing that the semantics for disjunctive-parthood is the result of inverting
the exact verifiers and falsifiers in the semantics for conjunctive-parthood, thereby validating
A Ď B $  A ď  B and A ď B $  A Ď  B. See Fine (2017a, p. 661) for related results.
38 Proof: If A Ď B and B Ď A, then A^B ” B and B ^A ” A, and so A ” A^B by A3
and R5. Thus A ” B again by R5, where the converse is immediate from A1.
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S11 σA ”  σA. S12 σ A ”  σA.
Rather than taking ‘σ’ to be a sentential operator, Fine (2016, 2017b, 2020)
identifies the subject-matter of a proposition with the fusion of all exact verifiers
and falsifiers for that proposition. Accordingly, the subject-matter of A is not
a proposition at all for Fine, but rather a single state, and so neither S11 nor
S12 can be interpreted on Fine’s semantics for subject-matter. Despite the
disparity in kind between Fine’s objectual account of subject-matter and the
propositional account assumed above, the undirected semantics validates the
same equivalences in eqpLq as Fine’s account of subject-matter.39 In particular,
S2 is invalid over the class of normal models N , contrary to the expectations
above. For instance, if A has no exact verifiers, then neither will A^B, though
A_B will retain all of the exact verifiers for B, where a similar discrepancy
may occur if B has exact falsifiers but A does not. Thus the parts of the
exact verifiers and falsifiers for A^B may diverge from the parts of the exact
verifiers and falsifiers for A_B, resulting in counterinstances to S2.
Rather than restricting attention to the nonvacuous models of L, or else
excluding S2 from the logic for subject-matter, I will provide a semantics which
validates all of the subject-matter principles considered above. It will help to
begin with a propositional analogue of another idea that Fine (2016, 2017b,
2020) develops, focusing at first on the positive subject-matter operator ‘σ`’.
In contrast to Fine who takes σ`A to be the fusion of the exact verifiers for
A, I will draw on the duality operator ‘δ’ defined in §5 in order to provide the
following dual semantics for the positive subject-matter operator ‘σ`’, where
xσ`Ay reads xIt is partially the case that Ay:40
pσ`q`d M, s , σ`A iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t , A_ δpAq.
pσ`q´d M, s - σ`A iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t - A^ δpAq.
Were we to omit ‘δpAq’ from the clauses above, σ`pA^Bq and σ`pA_Bq will
fail to be identical in cases where A has exact verifiers but B does not. However,
given the semantics for conjunction and disjunction, it is natural to expect
that it being partially the case that A^B is the same as it being partially the
case that A_B. A similar point holds for the negative subject-matter operator
which we may define by σ´A :“ σ` A, where xσ´Ay reads xIt is partially not
the case that Ay. By contrast, Fine’s objectual account takes σ´A to be the
fusion of all exact falsifiers for A. Accordingly, Fine must restrict consideration
to just the nonvacuous models of L, at least insofar as A^B and A_B are
to have the same positive and negative subject-matters in common.
Given the reading of ‘σ`’ together with the definition of ‘σ´’, we may define
the subject-matter operator by σA :“ σ`A_ σ´A, thereby incorporating the
39 See Fine (2016, p. 209) and Hawke (2018, p. 718) for similar observations.
40 I will assume an improper reading of ‘partially’ so that it being the case that A entails that
it is partially the case that A. See also Fine’s (2017b, p. 699) notion of partial aboutness.
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central idea behind the undirected semantics into a dual semantics for ‘σ’.
Thus xσAy reads xIt is partly the case that A or it is partly not the case that
Ay, where we may then derive the following dual semantic clauses for ‘σ’:
pσq`d M, s , σA iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t , A_ A_ δpAq _ δp Aq.
pσq´d M, s - σA iff s Ď t for some t P S where M, t - A^ A^ δpAq ^ δp Aq.
That the dual semantics validates both S1 and S2 over N should not surprise,
for the exact verifiers for σA include all parts of the exact verifiers for A,  A,
and their duals, where the same may be said of the exact falsifiers. Additionally,
the dual semantics validates the following distribution laws:
S13 σpA_Bq ” pσA_ σBq. S14 σpA^Bq ” pσA^ σBq.
Instead of revising the syntax for Lσ, we may continue to take ‘σ’ to be primitive
for present purposes, excluding ‘σ`’ and ‘σ´’ from L. Nevertheless, we may
draw on the definition of subject-matter given above in order to justify the
informal reading of ‘σ’ which the dual semantics makes precise. Additionally,
we may extend the proof theory to accommodate the subject-matter operator
by letting PI1σ extend PI
1 to include R6 along with S1, S2, S8, S11, and S13,
where we may then derive S3 – S7, S9, S10, S12, and S14.41
Having begun to survey the space of subject-matter principles, it remains
to provide an account of relevance. Were one to take the relevance operator
‘ĺ’ to be primitive, Rel could be captured by adding the following rule of
inference to PI1σ, where L1 – L4 could also be included in the logic:
R7 A ] B, C ĺ A $ C ĺ B.
A natural motivation for R7 conceives of relevance as a parthood relation for
subject-matter, so that A ĺ B asserts that the subject-matter of A is part of
the subject-matter of B.42 Thus, if A and B share the same subject-matter,
where the subject-matter of C is part of the subject-matter of A, then the
subject-matter of C is also part of the subject-matter of B. This justification
for R7 can be strengthened by defining relevance as A ĺ B :“ σA ď σB, or
equivalently, as A ĺ B :“ σA Ď σB. Informally, A is relevant to B just in case
the subject-matter of A is a disjunctive-part of the subject-matter of B, or
equivalently, the subject-matter of A is a conjunctive-part of the subject-matter
of B. Regardless of which convention one adopts, R7 along with L1 – L4 may
be derived in PI1σ, where Obj and Rel follow from R6 and R7 by classical
reasoning, thereby providing the beginnings of a theory of relevance.
41 It is worth noting that every ϕ P eqpLq is self-dual insofar as ϕ $1piσ δpϕq.
42 By contrast, there are the directed notions of positive relevance A ĺ` B :“ σ`A ď σ`B
and negative relevance A ĺ´ B :“ σ´A ď σ´B (or equivalently, A ĺ´ B :“ σ`A Ď σ`B)
which do not assimilate what is relevant to A and what is relevant to  A. For instance, as
brought out in footnote 18, although the exact verifier states for a sentence must be wholly
relevant to that sentence, those states may fail to be wholly relevant to its negation.
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It is worth noting that relevance is not an entailment relation on the present
understanding. For instance, although both A and B are relevant to A^B by
L2 and L4, neither A nor B entails A^B. Accordingly, the present account
of relevance is not to be assimilated to the notions of relevant entailment, or
analytic implication, as developed by the relevance logicians.43 Although one
could attempt to draw on a theory of relevance in combination with an account
of implication in order to provide an analysis of a relevant implication relation,
we may observe that disjunctive-part and conjunctive-part already amount to
forms of relevant implication. In particular, we may derive the following:
T1 A ď B $ A ĺ B. T2 A Ď B $ A ĺ B.
If A ď B, then by definition A_B ” B, and so B obtains in any possibility in
which A obtains. Thus A ď B may be taken to be an implication relation from
A to B, where the former must be relevant to the latter by T1. By contrast,
we may observe that if A Ď B, then by definition A^B ” B, and so A obtains
in every possibility in which B obtains. Accordingly, A Ď B may be taken to
be an implication relation from B to A, where the latter must be relevant to
the former by T2. Given that both relevance and implication flow from left to
right for disjunctive-part, but in opposite directions for conjunctive-part, it is
disjunctive-part rather than conjunctive-part which makes for the most apt
comparison with the entailment relations studied in relevance logics.
In contrast to the rough outline presented in §2, the axioms and rules
included in PI1σ provide a much richer theory of both subject-matter and
relevance. Nevertheless, it remains to establish completeness over the semantics
defended above, if the semantics has a complete logic at all. Additionally, it
is desirable to provide a semantics that does not restrict consideration to the
sentences in idσpLq, interpreting sentences which contain any combination
of sentential operators included in the language.44 Nevertheless, maintaining
the restriction to idσpLq provides a first step towards a logic of propositional
identity with greater expressive power. In particular, I will take PI1σ to provide
an elegant theory of propositional identity with a well motivated semantics
which is able to individuate propositions according to their subject-matter
rather than their modal profile alone, thereby satisfying the aims set out above.
7 Appendix
I will begin by considering propositional languages of the form L “ xL, ~Qy where
each Qni P ~Q is an n-ary sentential operator for some n P N, and ~Q includes the
extensional connectives ‘ ’, ‘^’, and ‘_’ along with the propositional identity
operator ‘”’. The well-formed sentences in wfspLq consist of the sentence
letters in L along with any Qni p ~Oq, where Qni P ~Q and ~O is a sequence of n
43 For instance, see Anderson et al. (1976), Angell (1989), and Parry (1989).
44 I provide such a semantics in Brast-McKie (2020).
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well-formed sentences. Assuming a background classical logic in which xAÑ By
abbreviates x A_By, we may consider the following:
Ref A ” A.
Sym pA ” Bq Ñ pB ” Aq.
LL pA ” Bq Ñ pC Ñ CpB{Aqq.
Trans pA ” Bq Ñ rpB ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqs.
Imps pA ” Bq Ñ pAÑ Bq.
Func pA ” Bq Ñ rQp ~Oq ” Qp ~OpB{Aqqs.
As above, L is transparent just in case all instances of Func hold, where
xQp ~OpB{Aqqy is the result of replacing one or more instances of xAy which occur
as members of the sequence x ~Oy with xBy, where similarly xQp ~OrB{Asqy is the
result of replacing all instances of xAy which occur as members of the sequence
x ~Oy with xBy. Additionally, I will take xCpB{Aqy to be the result of replacing
one or more instances of xAy as it occurs anywhere in xCy with xBy, as well as
taking xCrB{Asy to be the result of replacing all instances of xAy as it occurs
anywhere in xCy with xBy. We may now prove the following propositions.
P1 If L is transparent, then Ref and Imps entail both Sym and Trans.
Proof. Assuming that L is transparent, pA ” Bq Ñ rpA ” Aq ” pB ” Aqs
follows, where rpA ” Aq ” pB ” Aqs Ñ rpA ” Aq Ñ pB ” Aqs holds by Imps,
and so pA ” Bq Ñ pB ” Aq follows from Ref by propositional logic. Again by
transparency, pA ” Bq Ñ prpA ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqs ” rpB ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqsq,
and so pA ” Bq Ñ prpA ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqs Ñ rpB ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqsq by Imps.
Since pA ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cq holds by propositional logic, we may conclude as
desired that pA ” Bq Ñ rpB ” Cq Ñ pA ” Cqs.
L1 If L is transparent, then Ref and Imps entail pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CrB{Asq.
Proof. Assuming that L is transparent, the proof proceeds by induction on the
complexity of C P wfspLq. Of course, if C P L, then pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CrB{Asq
holds by propositional logic if A occurs in C, and C ” CrB{As holds by Ref
otherwise, where pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CrB{Asq follows by propositional logic.
Assume for induction that pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CrB{Asq holds whenever
comppCq ď n, and let comppCq “ n ` 1. Assuming that C “ Qnp ~Dq, we
may observe that for all 1 ď i ď n that pA ” Bq Ñ pDi ” DirB{Asq follows
by hypothesis, where pDi ” DirB{Asq Ñ rQnp ~Eq ” Qnp ~ErDirB{As{Disqs by the
transparency of L for any ~E. Assuming A ” B, it follows for all 1 ď m ď n that
Qnp ~DrD1rB{As{D1s...rDmrB{As{Dmsq ” Q
np ~DrD1rB{As{D1s...rDm`1rB{As{Dm`1sq. Given
that Ref and Imps, it follows by P1 that Trans holds, and so by n ´ 1
applications of Trans, Qnp ~Dq ” Qnp ~DrD1rB{As{D1s...rDnrB{As{Dnsq. We may then
observe that Qnp ~DrD1rB{As{D1s...rDnrB{As{Dns “ Q
np ~DqrB{As, and so it follows by
discharging our assumption that pA ” Bq Ñ pQnp ~Dq ” Qnp ~DqrB{Asq. Since
C “ Qnp ~Dq, we may conclude that pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CrB{Asq.
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P2 Assuming Ref and Imps, then L is transparent just in case LL holds.
Proof. Assume Ref and Imps. Letting LL hold in L where Q is an operator
in L, it follows that pA ” Bq Ñ prQp ~Oq ” Qp ~Oqs Ñ rQp ~Oq ” Qp ~OqpB{Aqsq.
However, given Ref, Qp ~Oq ” Qp ~Oq, and so pA ” Bq Ñ rQp ~Oq ” Qp ~OqpB{Aqs.
In particular, pA ” Bq Ñ rQp ~Oq ” Qp ~OpB{Aqqs as in Func. Generalising on
A,B, ~O, and Q, we may conclude that L is transparent.
Assume instead that L is transparent. Letting p P L where p does not
occur in B or C, it follows by L1 that pp ” Bq Ñ pCpp{Aq ” Cpp{AqrB{psq.
However, Cpp{AqrB{ps “ CpB{Aq, and so pp ” Bq Ñ pCpp{Aq ” CpB{Aqq. Thus
pA ” Bq Ñ pC ” CpB{Aqq in particular, and so LL follows by Imps.
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